By Jonathan Eyal Europe Correspondent
In London
THE problems that currently dog the euro zone countries can be traced
back to the end of the Cold War two decades ago, a period when, paradoxically,
Europe seemed to be at the height of its powers.
It was then that the European Union embarked on its most audacious
project: the creation of the euro as its single currency. Some experts warned
that no monetary union can succeed unless national economies approach a similar
level of development and spending priorities are decided centrally, rather than
in each state.
But the Europeans ignored such warnings because at the time, their
economies were growing, the Soviet Union was defeated and the former communist
countries of Eastern Europe were rushing to copy the West's economic and
political model.
The result, however, is today's disaster.
What went wrong? A currency designed for an economic powerhouse such as
Germany was also adopted by Greece, whose exports are less than a tenth those
of Singapore's.
According to European treaties, governments were required to watch their
finances and not borrow more than they could afford. But the restrictions were
simply ignored. In the past, governments of weaker and poorer European states
had to pay higher interest when they borrowed. But once everyone in Europe had
the euro, they could all borrow at the cheap interest rates which previously
only a country like Germany enjoyed.
Debt piled up as it became easier for politicians in poorer countries to
borrow money in order to offer their voters new social benefits than it was to
tax their people to pay for these spending promises.
Yet the game had to stop at some point and it did, once it became clear
that some countries were simply unable even to keep up with the repayments on
their loans, since their total debt was higher than the value of their entire
economy. By 2010, for instance, Greek debt stood at 120 per cent of the
country's gross domestic product (GDP). In effect, the country was bankrupt.
Others such as Portugal, Ireland and Spain too ran into debt problems.
They were ultimately bailed out, but only in return for agreeing to apply
severe austerity measures. The Greek economy has fallen by an average of 5 per
cent for the past four years. Unemployment in Spain stands at 23 per cent of
the population.
Nor is this all, for Europe's long-term economic competitiveness is
being destroyed by an over-valued currency as well. For example, since Italy
adopted the euro, its effective exchange rate - based on its labour costs -
rose by 26 per cent. The only way this disparity can be addressed is by either
devaluing the currency, or by depressing the salaries of workers, a method
which economists call "internal devaluation".
The first option is not available, since the euro is controlled by a
bank beyond the influence of any government. And the second option is equally
impossible, since workers will not tolerate a huge drop in their earning power.
Getting out of Europe's monetary union is not an option either.
According to the most optimistic calculations, an exit from the euro could cost
Italy about 10 per cent of its GDP and it will need about 25 years of
uninterrupted growth to merely recover from this loss. In short, the Europeans
are damned if they stay in the euro, and damned if they don't.
What lies ahead is decades of misery. Since the end of World War II,
Europe's economic model had been broadly the same. Each government came to
power promising to expand the provision of health care and welfare services.
And each took it for granted that the economy would inevitably continue to
grow. Capital was cheap, companies made fat profits and jobs were plentiful.
Europe's model has been fraying for years. An ageing population has already
made the generous provision of pensions unsustainable.
Europe's current crisis means that the hard choices can no longer be
postponed. As debts are being repaid, welfare entitlements will be slashed. And
Europeans will be forced to save rather than spend, leading to a prolonged
period of zero growth.
The consequences for Asia are both direct, and potentially severe.
Europe is still the world's biggest trading bloc: the overall value of EU
exports and imports of goods and services and foreign direct investments is
worth about €3.5 trillion (S$5.6 trillion) a year. And although by 2015 it is
estimated that 90 per cent of world growth will be generated outside Europe, it
still accounts for about 18 per cent of world trade, so what happens in Europe
directly affects economies everywhere.
Furthermore, a prolonged recession in Europe also means that China's
economy may not be able to grow as fast as anticipated, and that in turn could
hurt the economies of other Asian countries which depend on exports to China
for growth as well: that's why, as a rule, bad economic news in Europe tends to
depress stock market valuations across the world, and particularly in Asia
which relies so much on trade for its prosperity.
There is also a risk that, as the crisis in Europe continues, there will
be pressure on European states to protect local jobs by restricting trade, or
by deliberately pushing the currency down to make their exports cheaper. For
the moment, such protectionist temptations are being avoided; indeed, the EU is
negotiating a bigger free trade agreement with the United States, and with key
Asian countries. But as the crisis continues to bite, the danger of
protectionism will loom large.
The failure of the euro to become a truly global currency on a par with
the US dollar also affects Asia, partly because it would have been good to have
an investment alternative to the US dollar, but also because most Asian central
banks hold a part of their reserves in euros, and could therefore suffer
losses.
Still, not all the consequences of Europe's crisis are negative for
Asia. The prolonged recession in Europe means that Asian countries can pick up
some good investments in Europe, since these are cheap. Sovereign wealth funds
from Asia have been purchasing European assets, particularly those in the
high-tech industry, luxury goods and design, areas in which Europe continues to
excel. Most of Europe's car manufacturing sector also has a large content of
Asian capital, particularly from China.
Europe's prolonged recession also means that highly-qualified Europeans
are available to be hired for jobs in Asia; their talent can help Asian
economies grow even further.
And ultimately, the crisis over the euro is also a reminder of the
pitfalls inherent in introducing a one-size-fits-all currency for a number of
countries; Asean, which also occasionally contemplated the introduction of a
single currency, now knows what to avoid.
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